The Great Debate: Moral Relativism Unpacked

speaker1

Welcome to our podcast, where we unravel the deep and often misunderstood concepts of philosophy! I'm your host, and today we're diving into one of the most controversial topics in metaethics: moral relativism. Joining me is an engaging co-host who is going to challenge me every step of the way. Let's start by setting the stage. Moral relativism has ancient roots, with figures like Herodotus and Protagoras in classical Greece, and Zhuangzi in ancient China. What do these historical figures tell us about the early debates on moral relativism?

speaker2

Wow, that's a great start! I had no idea that moral relativism had such a rich history. Herodotus, for example, noted the diversity of cultural practices and beliefs, suggesting that moral values are not universal. Protagoras famously said, 'Man is the measure of all things,' which seems to imply that moral judgments are subjective. But how did these ideas influence later philosophical thought?

speaker1

Exactly, and these ideas have had a profound impact. In the early days, moral diversity was widely acknowledged, but the predominant reaction was moral skepticism, not relativism. Thinkers like Sextus Empiricus argued that since there are so many different moral practices, we can't know which, if any, are true. This skepticism persisted through much of Western philosophy. It wasn't until the 20th century, with the rise of cultural anthropology, that moral relativism began to gain traction. Anthropologists like Franz Boas and his students, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, provided empirical evidence of diverse moral systems, challenging the notion of a single, universal moral truth.

speaker2

That’s really interesting! So, the idea of moral relativism gained popularity because of empirical evidence from anthropology. How does descriptive moral relativism (DMR) support this idea? Can you give me some concrete examples of significant moral disagreements across different cultures?

speaker1

Absolutely! Descriptive moral relativism (DMR) is the observation that different societies have different moral standards and practices. For instance, polygamy is widely accepted in some African and Middle Eastern cultures but is illegal in many Western societies. Another example is the practice of female genital mutilation, which is defended in some cultures as a rite of passage and condemned in others as a human rights violation. These deep and widespread moral disagreements suggest that moral values are not universal but culturally specific.

speaker2

Hmm, those are striking examples! But how do objectivists respond to DMR? Do they argue that these disagreements can be rationally resolved, and if so, how?

speaker1

Moral objectivists certainly have their responses. They argue that many of these disagreements can be resolved by appealing to common human values and needs. For example, John Rawls proposed the 'veil of ignorance' to find a fair and universal moral framework. They suggest that, in most cases, moral disagreements arise from factual or logical mistakes, and once these are corrected, a rational consensus can be reached. However, relativists counter that this is often not the case, especially in fundamental moral issues where the frameworks themselves are incommensurable.

speaker2

That’s a compelling point. So, metaethical moral relativism (MMR) takes it a step further, right? It suggests that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute but relative to the cultural or societal framework. Can you explain how this works and what it means for moral disputes?

speaker1

Exactly. Metaethical moral relativism (MMR) argues that moral judgments are true or false only relative to the moral standards of a particular society. This means that a statement like 'Polygamy is morally wrong' could be true in one society but false in another. Relativists argue that this is the best explanation for why some moral disagreements are so deep and irresolvable. For example, David Wong has suggested that different societies have different moral priorities, and these priorities can't be reconciled through rational argument alone.

speaker2

But doesn’t this idea of relative truth seem a bit, well, slippery? How do relativists handle the charge that their position is self-defeating or incoherent?

speaker1

That's a great question, and it's a common criticism. Relativists address this by distinguishing between the truth of moral judgments within a framework and the broader claim about the nature of moral relativism. They argue that while 'Polygamy is morally wrong' might be true in one framework and false in another, the statement 'Moral relativism is true' can be justified within a metaethical framework. Critics like Paul Boghossian argue that this distinction is not strong enough, but relativists contend that it provides a coherent and nuanced account of moral truth.

speaker2

That’s a lot to digest! Moving on, how has experimental philosophy contributed to our understanding of moral relativism? Have there been any interesting studies that support or challenge the idea of DMR and MMR?

speaker1

Experimental philosophy has shed some fascinating light on this. Studies by researchers like Shaun Nichols and Joshua Wright have shown that people's metaethical views are complex. While many individuals are objectivists, a significant number are relativists or meta-ethical pluralists, who believe that some moral truths are objective and others are relative. These studies also suggest that people are more likely to be relativists about moral issues when they think the parties involved are from different cultures. This empirical evidence supports the idea that DMR and MMR are not just philosophical constructs but have real-world implications.

speaker2

Wow, that’s really intriguing! So, if moral disagreements are often rooted in different cultural frameworks, how do proponents of MMR argue that these disagreements are rationally irresolvable? What kind of cases do they use to support their argument?

speaker1

Relativists argue that deep moral disagreements are often rationally irresolvable because the parties involved have fundamentally different moral frameworks. For example, in the debate over the death penalty, some societies might emphasize retribution and deterrence, while others focus on rehabilitation and human rights. These frameworks are so different that it’s difficult to find a common ground for resolution. Gilbert Harman, for instance, has argued that moral disagreements are often more about different values than about factual errors or logical inconsistencies.

speaker2

That makes sense. But what about the idea that moral relativism promotes tolerance? Many people believe that if we accept that different moral systems are equally valid, we’ll be more likely to tolerate and understand those who have different views. Is there any truth to that?

speaker1

There is some truth to that, and experimental studies have shown a correlation between accepting relativism and being more tolerant. However, the philosophical connection is more complex. J. David Velleman, for example, has argued that while relativism doesn’t necessarily provide a reason for tolerance, it can make people more willing to accept and respect different moral perspectives. This can lead to a more peaceful coexistence, even if the disagreements remain unresolved.

speaker2

Interesting! But what about mixed positions? Have any philosophers proposed a blend of relativism and objectivism that might offer a more nuanced approach to moral truth?

speaker1

Absolutely. David Wong, for instance, has developed a form of pluralistic relativism. He argues that while there are universal constraints on human morality based on common human needs and values, there can be more than one true